No. 15

Transcendental reduction

(around mid-December 1930)

<§ 1. Self-explication of the transcendental Ego and explication of the world opinion>

Descriptive doctrine of consciousness: process of consciousness as immanent temporal fact, process of consciousness as element of synthetic manifoldness of the same „intentional object.“ Consciousness as intentionality, as intention towards something. Distinctness and clarity, related to the synthetic manifoldness of actual and possible mental livings, entering a synthesis of identification of the same. To go over from the fact and the de facto synthetically-identifying combined mental livings to the open manifoldness of possible mental livings of some “manifoldness.”

To make processes of consciousness a theme with regard to their intentional object, that is to draw in by making distinct the mental living into some synthetic manifoldness of mental livings, in which the same intentional (“meant”) becomes distinct, and, in a further clarifying way, in which it becomes intuitive, as it would present itself, although in one of its options.

Correlative mental livings of consciousness as mental livings of the same Ego, in their noetic modes, in which they make this Same conscious or would make it conscious, can make it conscious. Thus the modes of positionality and *quasi*-potentiality, of the background and foreground, of the determinedness and indefiniteness, the actual and possible originality (original temporalization), the one-sidedness, the presumptive mutuality, etc. Thereby also the identical “Ego” is questioned, functioning as Ego of the consciousness, as passively affected or active, and thus the egoical modes are in question, the way they show themselves in the mental living as a mental living within the manifoldness of mental living and in all that, which is manifold.

I – Unity of my Ego, one in the manifoldness of such mental livings – but one in constant self-coincidence in all my [229] mental livings as such, in all actual and possible mental livings, in which the same object, and which object ever, is meant or to be meant, Ego the center of all positions and *quasi*-positions for all “objects.”

But am I not one of the “objects” myself, given as a unit of manifold ways of consciousness, in which I am conscious as one and the same, and of ways of self-experiencing, in which I am experienced as the same? Certainly, I for me. Everything that is an object for me is preceded by the actual and possible manifoldness of the consciousness of the same object, in which I am already the subject of consciousness. And likewise I precede myself as an “object” for me, as unit of my conscious passivity and activity, through which I am <in> manifold experiences, etc., the one being for me, the one and the same actual for me, to be accepted, etc. And this does concern me as a substrate-Ego of my lasting positions as well, my convictions (convictions of being and judgment), my judging convictions and convictions of the will, my purposes, my ways, the oughtnesses being accepted by me in their different modes.

I am being as that, can I “disclose” myself as that, uncover myself, although I am as that in general hidden to me, can be hidden. I am this, disclosed in activities of the consciousness related to me, while I am that, what I am in this consciousness and from this consciousness, so that this being-positionally-related-to-oneself has me as a subject of the consciousness of the uncovering ways of consciousness, to which the first belong as well though by way of possible reflection.

If I uncover myself, [if] I direct myself towards me and make distinct, clarify how I am, then I find myself in evidence and I still find myself thereby looking back “behind” the uncovering activity as the one who had previously already been, and in a reflecting attitude within the Now, as the one being already now “in advance”, already in reflecting.

The life of consciousness is not, as the old sensualism apprehended it a piece of “white paper” on which ever new signs show themselves. Everything I get to know as a process of consciousness (as something merely subjective) and in the form of immanent temporality seemingly overview in [230] an order of coexistence and succession, already has a consciousness behind it and the Ego behind it, which is not visible in this room.

In the **phenomenological reduction** I investigate sense on my true and perfectly concrete Ego, on me myself, being for me purely from me and being for me as “different”, something “worldly”, being, which I am not myself, being conscious of and accepting it. Also the structure of the world’s being-for-me belongs to the general structure of my concrete being – the one [world] being for me, to which of course the former one belongs – as far as I can somehow remember -, the one having been for me, although with a changing being content.

Inquiring in an eidetic way I take my de facto being as a pure possibility (which of course is still an option of my de facto I-am), and that, which I had as a horizon of de facto options within the fact, changes accordingly. I say within the fact already, looking over my past (and without the intention to get to know it in its individually concrete factualness in every actually remembered place according to true being): “Necessarily I had in every past conscious the world as being, necessarily this world has always been the same, although giving itself in a different way as to the content, necessarily the world had in every present the same general structure, and necessarily the changing ways of givenness themselves had a general structure.”

These necessities are indices for essential generalities. Within them lies some **apodicticity**, emerging within the eidos purely and as a pure generality. Changing myself eidetically as a **transcendental Ego** I have, however freely I fantasize otherwise, an immanent time horizon belonging to every immanent present according to past and future, and in every immanent present, whether in the form of some past or future one, world present is conscious to me, that is, experienced in any way, however meant on top of that, and the world present as present with a horizon of worldly future and of worldly past.

The phenomenological self-concentration is self-explanation of the transcendental Ego according to that, which is itself for itself and [231] according to that, which it “posits as non-Ego” within itself. Thereby the question is, what I can utter in apodictic evidence, that is, in eidetic generality.

With regard to my non-Ego – the world being accepted by me as being, or rather, a possible world, which should be able to be accepted by me, for me as some change of option of the Ego that I de facto am – my question relates to the general structure of the world accepted by me as being due to my actual and possible positional ways of consciousness of it, or rather, the way this acceptance comes about incrementally; that is with which relative sense of being of each step, which on the higher level is basis, basic acceptance, entering into the acceptance of being with higher steps up to the complete being sense of the world, whereas this carries all these founding’s hidden within itself, intentionally implied.

This implication becomes changed into explication by way of the phenomenological method. The world – everyone knows what this means, and thus the general sense “world” is the most known. And still it is the most unknown at the same time, always something meant, and everyone has his opinions on that, and changing ones within his life itself, and every philosopher [has] his philosophical opinions.[[1]](#footnote-1) But all such opinions relate to the ever already living basic opinion, explained by way of these opinions, connecting all with all within the community consciousness to live in the same world, to have pregiven the same.

What is this basic opinion connecting all my and all our opinions, prior to all philosophical, prior to all scientific explanation?[[2]](#footnote-2) What is the opinion going through my transcendental life (and then through the transcendental life of every fellow human) in a connecting way? However I think of myself as being changed, I experience the world, I have “the” world, i.e. the one and the same, in constant acceptance of experience, and I can thematically direct myself towards it as a world.

[232] But how do I explicate world experience as a “mere opinion”? I call it thus, because world indeed is experienced as a certainty in it, and still, as is to be noted soon, with an unclear horizon beyond the content, which I respectively “properly” perceive or rather, experience. I can question it like another opinion as to what is “enclosed” in it, what it means and especially what it means along of the already actually and immediately experienced, makes co-present, etc.

I already know now how an opinion as such, how a consciousness-of is examined and is explained: by way of making distinct and by clarification in the transition to the manifold clarifying opinions and eventually to the manifoldness of the experience, the grasping of something itself, in which I draw closer to the meant itself. Clarification has its pregnant sense especially then if the meant implies some manifoldness, which needs singly to be analyzed in a certain order, and needs to be understood in order that the clear opinion, or rather the meant becomes given in its clarity. Where something being is meant as incrementally founded on other beings, there the meaning is correlatively founded in its way as an explicit or a distinct one, and the distinct one then is the unity of the founding connection, as unity of a consciousness, in which that, which is meant there, is explicated according to its sense, which in advance had exactly these foundations in an implicit way. The distinctness, if it succeeds within the making distinct, leads to the evidence of the general positional option (non-contradiction), the clarity though leads to a unity of the objective option, the compatibility in the possible things themselves.

But now the experiencing world opinion is a special case. **Its distinction and clarification** **leads me to my whole conscious life**, which indeed and <in> all its immanent-temporal phases is already **world life**, world-experiencing life. But in a wondrous way not only in such a way that I get to know my universal life in all its “present” (of the now living, the having been and future ones) and in its de facto contents and possibilities belonging to it as synthetic manifoldness (and manifoldness itself [233] of manifoldness), in which “the world” were given as something separated from me.

Certainly the world is according to its sense a universe of “something other”, Ego foreign, wherever at least by Ego the concrete transcendental Ego (the monad) is understood. But in this world, within the foreign, I make an appearance myself, not as a transcendental Ego, but as a human. This means, I also have a special consciousness “within” the universal world consciousness, that is, an experiencing one, in which I emerge as something “alienated” to me, the concrete transcendental Ego.

However I change as a transcendental Ego, which has become aware of its transcendental being through phenomenological reduction from (the) natural attitude, I am subject of a world of mental living, and I were always only conceivable as emerging within it in self-alienation, in the transcendental otherness “human.” Self-alienation is brought about in the form of the world experiencing life and its implications; it is itself subject to the alienation as everything else belonging to me in a transcendental way. Every possible variant of my transcendental Ego (I, if I were different, which does not mean: somebody else), carries within itself the transcendental life’s form of alienation, life in naturalness <insofar> as it does not know anything of its transcendentality. To this (life) belongs the possibility of the transcendental reduction and through it to be “free” from self-alienation. But this is not to be misunderstood. The freeing consists in annulling blindness to transcendentality. But the world’s acceptance of being remains and thus also the acceptance of being of the Ego being experienced in an alienated way as a human, save that this acceptance of being relativizes itself. But all this relates to insights, which are to be comprehended only later.

All world opinion leads back to world experience, thus I already say in my natural-human attitude, and thus transcendentally. World experience, even opinion, leads back towards ever new world experience, an actual and possible one. But how is that? What is the method like with which to bring to givenness that, which is still undiscovered by experience, which is not given as being?

[234]

<§ 2. Explication of the world experience according to its temporal dimensions>

In technique and thus also in science we have methods consisting originally in a systematic building of single performances, the purposefulness of which was immediately, in every step, obvious, but which are no longer singly distinguished and originally obvious afterwards, during the use of the technical event. Instead the purposefulness’s matter of course and the arriving-at-a-goal related to this, emerging in training, exists. How now, is not experience itself already a method, a system of performances of customary usefulness, in order to reach a target? Is that, which is growing as a result (as a target), not a result of manifold actions as well, each of which generating something useful for this result? But there is also an original passive performance as presupposition for an optional activity, which for its part may have steps.

How is the world’s being “grounded” for me in my transcendental subjectivity, what kind of passive and active performance creates the basis for the option of activity, in which “world” is experienced and experienceable and persists through life as a being identical world? And how about true being, where does truth show itself within me, and in which existence, that is, worldly truth?

If I explicate the world as world of experience in an eidetic way, then I naively perform evidence of possible experience and of a synthetic experience to be performed in the progress from present to present. I do not make subjective experience itself and this synthesis, etc., transcendentally a theme. I do this as a philosopher of transcendentality, at first interested in my transcendental Ego, and in that, which is for me. I regard how the structure of the world experiencing life is created, the appearances emerging in it, the syntheses of appearances, and how unity goes through with an invariant structure.

[235] By clarifying this, I see correlatively foundations of the constituted unity and the constituting.[[3]](#footnote-3) Thereby I see that experience, always as an experience of unity already, has a horizon of past behind it, and projects <a> horizon of future, the latter one as a horizon of some presumption for the future course of experience and the future units as recurring in the sense of a constant synthesis of identification. As long as experience happens, my living in presumptive certainty is a necessity. Like I do have another certainty with regard to the past; because, as I said, every present world experience implies the certainty that it has past world experience behind it.

But will I ever live, and have I ever lived? How does death break the one and how does birth break the other certainty? Or rather, how does the certainty of my death mean a form of breaking this certainty? Where does the certainty of death in my life come from, which as an immanent one does already imply the presumption of future in a necessary way? Likewise birth.

I arrive at no barrier with my recollection, and still I cannot recollect in an unrestricted way. My recollection is always human recollection, I arrive at my human childhood, and then without an end and still not arbitrarily far. World is something identified according to the form of being, something memorially determined according to form, and in between apperceived as something to be determined, projected as future, etc.

This needs to be explicated: I have some “life time,” in which I always had some world time. During life-time I was a child and a mature, ageing man within the world, in a counted[[4]](#footnote-4) age (the animal – for itself – does not have any life-time, nor does it have any proper [236] world time. It only has a present surrounding world and <a> piece of recollection with recollected world and still no endless world time).

How do I now discover the foundings in the position of the world and thereby the whole connection of its founding, the one being originally performed within me, implied in the constant having of a world, in every world experience as implying the world sense respectively? How do I explicate the world’s being for me as being-subjectively-accepted-by-me, which is an acceptance on the basis of founding acceptances, which are thus implicitly presupposed as well, although not yet explicated, which need to be able to be explicated though, in order for the world as that, which it is for me, to be able to simply be accepted as existing for me? Among them are originally passive acceptances.

The world as world of my experience, on a stretch of universality, in which I have an unbroken certainty. Priorily: I say in an overviewing way, that the world has indeed always already been experienced for me, etc., but the universal style of positing was, that in detail appearances emerge, corrections reaching back; thereby generating of univocality by respective change of the pre-horizons correcting themselves thereby as well. I have constantly the one world in this univocality ever again generating itself, [the world] which is always the unity, remains the unity through potential corrections. Ever again the appearances can be corrected from it, and that which was and is lasting, has its experienceabilty. The correction does not shelter everything else, they are “contingent” errors, occasional ones.

Thus I now have the well-sounding certainty, and presuppose it as lasting. I have experienced world therein. How far does the perceptual world reach, grasped so narrowly and characterized by all determinations of the worldly experienced appresented there being definable by actual experience? There is the limit of empathy. Other ones belong to the world, I mentally live them, but that, which is psychically appresented is not presentable for me. What is the sense of this preference of the “perceptual world”?

[237]

<§ 3. Separation of the primordial sphere>

What[[5]](#footnote-5) belongs to my transcendental being, what, if I in training the epoché with regard to the world’s being, am referred back to my own being as a transcendental one, to all that belonging to it itself, and which it can posit and justify from it itself – within the reduction? This implies a differentiation as a hint, which at first sight is not obvious. At first it may seem, that I cannot find anything else in the phenomenological reduction than me myself – not other ones. But let us consider this.

My transcendental being is for me, saying in a transcendental attitude “I am”, given as itself “in a direct way.” I am by being conscious of me myself, that is, I am constantly conscious of me in the form of direct experience, as directly experienced, or rather, experienceable. The “in a direct way” only states emphatically that, which is already implied in the pregnant sense of experience, first of all perception, then memory as well (retention and recollection) and in a certain way also expectation as an immediate preview on that, which is coming.

Experience is the way of consciousness, in which that, which is conscious therein gives itself as itself[[6]](#footnote-6), and grasped in such a way, experience (as we mean along secretly) generates knowledge of something being, lastingly accepted and actual knowledge, if all further experience is right for that. I have an experience of me myself in transcendental attitude, I can constantly get a knowledge of me and keep up knowledge, and this relates to all my inner determinations; at first within self-perception with regard to my present, then from that which has streamed away within memory, in which I experience my self-own being in the mode of the having past, and with the sense to have been perceived or perceivable, and likewise for my future as the directly predelineated one with the sense of the becoming perceivable or perceived.

[238] I have an **apodictic certainty** of my own being; this does not mean that I experience everything being proper to me without further ado within my streaming self-experience, also that I cannot be deceived in this regard at all. On closer consideration not belonging here it is shown that I am apodictically certain of my being with regard to the essential form going through every univocal self-experience, which necessarily needs to be filled, and [that I] can only be mistaken with regard to the special filling in detail, that is, by the help of the incomplete self-giving of memory and expectation.

Anyway still, if we leave aside the problems of apodicticity, I have self-experience, and if at all, it is this by which I get to know my own being, what I am myself, in an immediate way. If I stick to mere possibilities and if I explore eidetically, then I gain the general and pure proper essence of my and every Ego through variation of self-experience, which springs as a possible one from my changing.

How far now does self-experience as a transcendental one reach? Does it encompass each and every transcendentally to be posited, transcendentally to be justified, nay, transcendentally experienceable? The transcendental Ego experiences itself in self-perception, -memory and –expectation, it experiences itself thereby as experiencing the world in worldly perception, etc., only that for me, as a phenomenologically interested transcendental Ego, of course this worldly experience does not form any basis.

Here now the differentiation of the transcendental’s primordial sphere of being needs to be motivated.

The following needs to be considered here. Throughout the epoché, which I, beginning as I, this man, have performed, I am still I – the same I, just that I, keeping the world’s being in doubt (putting it aside), posit myself exclusively as Ego in my absolute property, and thereby show myself as positing the world as being and therein me as a man as consciously being, etc. And world itself then only belongs to me as a pole or pole universe in my acceptances of consciousness. I am then in a certain way in total coincidence with that, which I had priorily grasped in a concrete way as my pure mental person, with [239] everything that made it a concrete soul of the body pre-given in advance.[[7]](#footnote-7) The concrete person as substrate of the characteristics of ability, of habitual opinions, of characteristic features, etc., as living in manifold mental livings of the consciousness, all this is in its unity, exactly as it, itself according to consciousness, made me up in my horizon of being (that of my proper personal being), goes over into transcendental attitude. And in this newly grasped, but in its core old sense I, as a phenomenological novice, say: I am.

If I thus ask now: What can I utter in the transcendental attitude, what can I, now that the world is bracketed in, cognize as something transcendentally being? And if I answer first of all: I myself am, I, experiencing the world, having had and having manifold opinions concerning the world and worldly details, - thus I already have a predelineation for that, which I have to interpret and to describe as an I. Reflecting on me, and in order to grasp and describe myself in my selfness, I exclusively stick to self-experience. Then I am for me in complete concretion a theme, experiential theme.

I am the **concrete person** thereby (that, which priorily in a quite understanding way was accepted by me as soul), I do not need to first construct myself according to this form, I am already this, and my being as a personal one is always already a being-for-me, being-“conscious”-of-myself. It is just not necessarily a being-directed-towards-me-as-a-theme, a directing-the-view-on-me-in-a-reflecting-way, and even in theoretically phenomenological intention. Doing this though, I explicate that, which, although it is concretely observed, all the while in the first regard is “undetermined.” I wish to determine it in an experiencing way, in a singly experiencing way, I wish to get to know it the way it is singly, according to single features, to contents. I thereby explicate that which is already pregiven from my life of consciousness, has a unity of consciousness in itself, and is a unity of consciousness, unity of acceptance as a unity of possible self-perception, self-experience. I make my Ego, which already has its structure of acceptance for me, but as (only occasionally in details, never consequently though) [240] an unexplicated horizon, a theme – the same, which priorily had been for me as an I in the common sense, as a mental I in the world life. That which I will define as my own being in its different sides, contents, features is predelineated therein according to the form.

I thus “know” – implicitly – in advance, what self-perception, self-experience means, whereto is directed therein as such that, which determines my own being. And still only in the human-worldly sense; because the transition of my Ego being human for me into that which is transcendental for me (for me, having become conscious of my transcendentality in the latter case) has as an actual predelineation only that, which is pre-shaped by manifold reflective self-experience.

<§ 4. The transcendental intersubjectivity. The transcendental Ego as the absolute human person>

As[[8]](#footnote-8) a person I was **facing** my fellow men, the things, the realities of our world. By their being accepted by me straightforwardly, being simply there for me in the confrontation, I did not differ between the worldly *cogita qua cogitata* in me and the worldly actuality itself. That which I grasped as my person, was distinguished from the external realities, which I was looking at respectively, which were pregiven and in advance. I rated as mine my characteristic features, my habits, my knowledge, etc. and my life of consciousness, proceeding as my experiencing the world, my thinking the world, living-in-the-world, living-into-it, etc.

But by my having the world as a basis for my person’s living, in constant pregivenness, the constantly meant world as such, being conscious in the consciousness of pregivenness, the accepted one of its respective content and mode of givenness was missing in my life of consciousness. Likewise in detail: the respectively singly meant thing as such in its immanence, in manifold acts of consciousness [241] of the same thing, coming to unity and selfness in immanent synthetic identification. The thing is outside, it is in itself the way it is, I look at it, then again [I do] not, then repeatedly, seeing it again at new opportunities, I simply see the same external thing. But that within viewing itself, and undistinguishably from it, that is, in the mental immanence is implied something seen as such, and in the not-seeing-any-more that, which is accepted as such in the other mode of the still-having-in-one’s grip, that is not thematically distinguished and thus does not determine the soul.

(Yet in the case of the illusory semblance there will be a differentiation. The “illusory image” is within me, but outside there is nothing. One utters then, “I meant to see, I meant to perceive, it was no actual seeing”, instead of saying, “I have seen, but that, which I have seen lost its acceptance of being for me through the experience’s discordancy in the further connection of world acceptance, of consciousness.” The theory of cognition and psychology, determined by such disturbing occurrences then draws the differentiation of the immanent world objectivation, the immanent objectivation as such, and of the world in its own actuality, called the objectivated one there, whereby the former one is now further interpreted quite roughly as a depiction, now as a symbolic display. I ignore this here; I am speaking of the consciousness of one’s own personality growing and further forming itself in man’s life (and then likewise in that of the other ones), and of that, which prior to all scientific reflection and theorizing is made of it, how personality is there reinterpreted as a psychological soul.

Here lies the source of infertility of the whole newer theory of cognition and philosophy, at the same time the source of infertility of the whole newer psychology. As the former one, also where it proclaimed itself as immanent philosophy, was never able to actually reach the “immanent”, the transcendental ground of experience, to see it in its proper being and to explicate it, thus the latter one was unable to [reach] the immanent ground of experience of the proper mental and then of the mental internality as such.)

[242] But that, which we are interested in here, is, that within the world life of the persons[[9]](#footnote-9) (I, other ones), and apprehended in a purely mental way, this is indeed in constant self-experience as a habitual I of a consciousness life, but <knows> itself as related to the world, which is pregiven as being, presupposed as being, in this life, in its experiencing, thinking, judging, acting [life], and as being itself in it in the psychophysical unity of person or soul and body. In this self-concept is not done enough for the immanence of the personal being with regard to all that, which is own essential for it. In this apperception the heeding and explication of the worldly intentional as such is missing, universally for the world consciousness and especially for single real things, and that, which has never been explicated, is not predelineated within the apperception “I”, not predelineated as a general form of acquaintedness, as that, which could guide the explication onto known paths.

What now if I say “my life” in phenomenological attitude, and start to explicate it? I, as having a world, I, in whose appearance world appears (in whose opinion world is meant, I as subject of the consciousness life, in that which I call the world, first of all gains and has acceptance), can leave aside the sense of the world, can possibly ask, if and in what sense, in what dimension my world opinion is to be accepted, and prior to the decision, in which it is not yet decided for me myself, whether I can be accepted by me as a man in the world, I am (even apodictically) certain of my being and of this world’s <being>, in which the appearing of the world, the opinion it was a world, and it was this and that, and even my asking takes place.

**But what is then posited in this transcendental attitude as I, what kind of asking horizon does the self-explication have?** How can I take over then the personal self-apperception from the natural attitude? I say “I” and apprehend myself as subject obviously as the one identical subject of the manifold ways of consciousness, [243] in which I have conscious something worldly and universally and the world as a being one constantly in the flow, as being accepted by me, nay I have it conscious in the experience as directly experiencing it, as directly perceiving it with regard to its present, with regard to its past as a past present, etc.

How do I take over from humanity I and consciousness, since I have denied in the epoché all reality, the reality of the I (as being in the pregiven spatiotemporal world), likewise the reality of the processes of consciousness? How does “the same”, which I had ascribed as being the proper one of my human personality or soul, differ from “the same”, which should be positable as something transcendental, as being in the frame of the world kept questionable? This is a “phenomenon” now – what kind of being is it, this being as a phenomenon, even though it was a dependent one, namely determining my own transcendental being? It is the **<world> as such being conscious** within consciousness life, above all the one **appearing as such** within the continuously experiencing life of the awake Ego continuously as present, as past. But how is this “seemingly past one as such”, etc., characterized in detail?

Such questions do also arise in the natural and above all [in] the psychological attitude, and to answer them, that is, to explicate the psychological subjectivity in its peculiarity and purity, to go beyond the vague form of acquaintance within the apperception “I as a person and a subject of my whole consciousness life”, this means to build a phenomenological and eventually also an eidetic inner psychology and to be pushed thereby over into a transcendental phenomenology. On both sides I keep on creating the guiding apperception. I face the question within the transcendental attitude: the world – I mean the world being for me, being accepted by me in its whole content, which is for me and at the same time also for the other ones, but for the other ones who from my accepting are other ones and as that do also belong to the world I mean. I am as the one experiencing the world, all being for me as something worldly <arrives> at the acceptance of being within my consciousness, in the best case in my [consciousness], legitimating as a univocal experience or, based on that, [244] legitimating in a thinking grasping way. **I am as such a subject of the world acceptance, which is mine, a presupposition for this world.** How am I as the Ego performing, legitimating the acceptance of the world in itself in the first place; how is the being of the world, the world, which is and could ever be for me, grounded in my meaning, in my streamingly perceiving and other consciousness life, in my lasting peculiarities? And am I not myself for me myself from my consciousness life? How am I being for myself, how is my own being as being for me grounded within myself?

If I said that as a phenomenological psychologist, how then? I would then take myself as a man within the pre-given, pre-accepted world; in truth I already form pure phenomenology, a transcendental one, by consequently thinking to an end. My transcendental essence, explicated in a phenomenological way then becomes the determination of my being as a man in the world, like the clarification of the other one in his transcendentality and in the transcendental intersubjectivity is used to determine the togetherness of men in the world and their worldly being.

But now I gain the world’s transcendental sense of being on the absolute ground of transcendental intersubjectivity, as deduced from my transcendental self-being, I understand my former naively natural attitude as a special attitude and a kind of behavior of mine as that of the Ego transcendentally constituting the world, but I also understand that my finding-myself-as-a-man-in-an-experiencing-way is a transcendental performance, that of self-secularization; likewise I understand, and inseparably thereof, the other ones as transcendental other ones, given as transcendental subjects of the same world, which is mine, in my cognitive performance, and are thereby as for their part objectivating themselves grasped as humanizing themselves.

This is thus at the same time the transcendental clarification and transcendental justification of the world’s being and of our human being and the transcendental justification of the sciences determining the worldly being, among them psychology. For the latter one this implies that the psychological [245] explication of the man is, with regard to his purely mental existence performed by the transcendental explication of the transcendental Ego, corresponding to every man, like the interpersonal and purely psychological interpersonal consideration of the human community is performed by a corresponding transcendental justification of the intersubjectivity as secularizing itself. The being of the world, by being transcendentally clarified, is understood and justified in one by final, the absolute sources of the being, whereby the scope of this being as cognized and cognizable being at the same time lies in the radical justification.

We can also say that the performance of an **objective theory of cognition** happens here in the transcendental phenomenology, a theory of the possibility and scope of the world cognition. If the transcendental phenomenology, at least on its first step, has done its job, has at least in the most general sense encompassed the universal structure of being and the world, then also the **sense of the method of the epoché** is grasped, which at the beginning was not supposed to be understandable in its scope. It leads to the first, which is absolute for me, to me as a transcendental Ego, and by its guiding away towards the explication of the concretion of this Ego within the primordiality and towards the clarification of the other ones’ constitution as of other men, and then of myself as a man in the world – which receives its transcendental sense thereby itself -, the refraining from the positing of the world is systematically voided. The transcendental presuppositions of the world’s positing, the transcendental bases for it are systematically discovered, and discovered as transcendentally valid ones in transcendental evidence.[[10]](#footnote-10) And eventually the being world grows in the acceptance of being, in the same it has in naivety, now though by discovering the transcendental horizons of presupposition. The absolute sense of the world as something absolute necessarily secularizing itself is understood; as self-objectivation of the absolute the [246] world carries the absolute within itself simply in an objectivated way, as discovering there in the course from naivety towards transcendentality. On the other side the absolute carries the world within itself as a necessary performance of self-objectivation, in which it can only be what it is: transcendental inter-subjectivity.

The transcendental Ego is nothing else than the absolute human person, which as such appears objectively, but in this objectivated way implies within itself the essential option of transcendental self-discovering by way of the phenomenological reduction. And the transcendental intersubjectivity is – at least on its first step, which has not yet encompassed the animal being and the complete worldly being in its concrete infinity – nothing else than human community in its open infinity, but understood as the absolute community of persons in the transcendental sense. This is what the true, the philosophically authentic anthropology, the one clarifying the absolute sense of human existence and of worldliness and justifying the absolute sense of **Augustine’s** sentence “*in interiore homine habitat veritas*”[[11]](#footnote-11) in strictly scientific method, looks like in contrast to the naïve anthropology remaining in positivity.

<§ 5.> Phenomenological reduction and situation. <The world as a> universal situation[[12]](#footnote-12)

Let us now go back to the most important task having come to us by way of the first austerity of the new attitude (through radically kept phenomenological reduction). What does the firm habituality of will of the phenomenological attitude say? I do not wish to accept as that the pre-given world, the world I have in advance and in my whole natural further living as a being one, and to ask questions on this ground of being. I want to make myself exclusively a theme as a subject of consciousness for the world: [247] what the world consciousness looks like, how world gets a sense in the acceptance of being for me therein. I want to judge not the world as such, but purely the subjective being-for-me of the world, or rather, purely me, insofar as world appears within me, and within me being of the world constitutes itself as a subjective fact, namely as being accepted by me, as experienced and proving itself to me as always, gains and has always already gained acceptance of being for me, and all proving for me, to which I wish to attribute some right.

True being, a proved one, right of proving, all these are occurrences in my subjectivity, it is me cognizing truth, presenting right, and having a consciousness of the differences right and wrong. And all that is given to me in the epoché as something “subjective”, and shall be taken purely as that, which emerges in my circle of consciousness. The world is and remains the one being accepted by me, the reduction does not change anything in this. It only bars me from accepting the being world in such a way as it had always already been and is accepted as a being one, as a ground, as a pregiven horizon of being, merely asking what may be stated then possibly or as such of the world in truth. If I bar myself from the world’s ground of asking within the epoché and thus the target of its theoretic explication, of this already being one, then it still remains at that, it keeps on being accepted by me as being the way it had been accepted, with all its reasons, from which this being has become accepted by me. I take exactly this new direction of asking as a new and exclusive one: I grasp the world being accepted by me purely as being accepted by me, whereby the being accepted by me is to be understood according to the sense content in my life of consciousness with all its change and its unity keeping on.

To regard the world, this accepted one by me with its concrete sense, in a purely subjective way, indeed means to go back to my subjectivity, which is always spoken about, but it does not merely mean regarding me as being, to only accept me as being, and of course not, and in no way, the world, with regard to whose being I had decided that epoché. Indeed the epoché in our sense, in which we deny ourselves to perform the acceptance of the pregiven world as basic acceptance, within which now furthermore is only asked, what the world is made of, [248] how its being is methodically defined through experience and science, - may not be confused with an epoché, wishing to once and for all to refrain from **every** judging the world, from the acknowledgment of its being and in further consequence of its being thus.

As to the former, one may, although standing and remaining within the natural pregivenness of the world, remind of all occasional, or, as should be rather said, **situational judgments**. The respective situation, in which I am, e.g. sitting in the theatre or entering a shop as a buyer or into an unknown countryside, has a unitarily apprehended but unexplicated sense of existence, determining as a pregiven horizon of being sense and acceptance of the respective experiences and judgments of situation. I can explicate the situation as situation, as my momentary horizon of existence; get to know it first, if it is new, or, at least where it is well known, singly regard and judge events happening in it (the relatively persisting one), as otherwise bear a practical relationship towards it. But all such judgments have the **situation as a ground**, and their presentable truth is the truth of the situation. The situation is pregiven to me, it is accepted by me in advance, whether it be in a horizonlike unexplicateness and indefiniteness, its acceptance for me is a **basic acceptance** for all closer knowledge according to my respective interest.

Every situation itself has its external horizon and eventually the world horizon, that of the ever already accepted world, the one which in “natural” life always already functions as basic acceptance for all acceptances. The special basic acceptances, those of the special situation are those “within” the most general basic acceptance of the “natural” attitude towards life, so that we can call the world’s being-in-advance for us that of the **“universal” situation**, within which all our natural questions move, all theoretical as well as practical questions, or rather, all acceptances of being, acceptances of value, practical acceptances, which are brought about and to be brought about themselves in peculiarity. All human life as a positional one, as positing, as proving, as theoretical or practical, has its situation, and the universal situation of all situations is the world, that which has always already been for me. This is transferred from [249] “We” to “I” – I, the one investigating sense, have always already been within the world situation.

In this regard now the phenomenological epoché results in putting this kind of “occasional” judging and thus all world judgments “out of” action or to bar me from this basic acceptance, as the one offering a ground of being for judgments to be formed. But thereby the being of the world for me, namely the being-accepted-by-me- (and as a further result –us-)-as-being is not deleted. The epoché only means: World does merely not serve as a universal situation for the positing of questions in phenomenology, and with it all special situations and judgments on special situations are put out of the action.[[13]](#footnote-13)

<§ 6. Sense and task of transcendental questions>

After the sense of the transcendental epoché, or rather, of the transcendental attitude is freed from possible misunderstandings, and its own sense has been established, the sense of transcendental questions and statements is also defined by that. Every being to be discovered within the epoché is something “transcendentally being.” Transcendental phenomenology is the universal science of the transcendental, of that, which I, the philosophizing one having taken a philosophical, i.e. a transcendental attitude can discover as being, that is, exclusively within this attitude. If phenomenology or philosophy are not only my subject-matter, but also that of other ones, and if it has objectivity in that sense that it keeps on growing in common research and in the infinity of progressing generations of researchers, then this objectivity, as being accepted by me, presupposes that I have already discovered the being of others as a transcendental one on my transcendental-methodical way and of an open manifoldness of others, and discovered as a we-community, in which some objectively common [250] comes to transcendental acceptance and proving. But how within my reinstituted transcendental acceptances of the beings of others and even of other transcendental subjects acceptances may be transcendentally ascertained and something like communalizing, is not to be seen yet.

My starting point thus is the **transcendental question**: How does the conscious in me, the experienced, meant, accepted as being under the title “world” look like in this acceptance of being, how do I become certain of it, how do I describe it, how can I show and ever again show it, how does that which thus subjectively emerges at it itself in quite different ways, as something experienced, as thus or thus meant, etc. look like, or how the experiencing itself as experiencing something worldly and the like, how is it to be described, what kind of performance is it, in which it produces the acceptance of being of this sense “world” in me? Like all these manifold mental livings of the world consciousness combine to the unity of a complete performance making a unity of something meant to be objective, and universally spoken, of an objective universe go through the manifold subjective, that is the theme opening up in the epoché.

**First** I thus encounter the question: How am I as this subject for the world, what belongs to me and, spoken in a concrete way, to [me?] as my own essence? The next, on which the regard thereby rests, are the performances of consciousness essentially proper to me, those coming up for the being sense world. They are as my life of consciousness essentially proper to me, I live in them, I am in them, I am as experiencing now this, the other time that, soon theoretically thinking, soon looking around in a merely playful way, soon as practically fearing, etc. – **all that in the epoché**.

Obviously I can also justify eidetic research as a transcendentally subjective one; as an Ego with a transcendental attitude I reconsider myself in a freely fantasizing way, maintaining that I am a world subject, I thereby reconsider the world. Every reconsidering the world changes me myself from the actual into a possible Ego. Thus re-fantasizing me, or rather correlatively the world, I imagine my pure options in evidence, and run through them, in my [251] [world] and a world as such, which could be mine, explore <its> invariant essence.

<§ 7.> Realizing apperception of the mental Ego

For the pure bringing out of this original theme the differentiation between the **transcendental subjective** and the **psychological subjective** is decisive. If the world is bracketed in, thus [are] also my fellow men, and likewise my body in its worldliness, or, as <we> could also say, in its spatiotemporal being. My soul is a soul as in its belongingness to this body spatialized and temporalized with it. But I, the I mentally living this body apperception and the apperception of the mental founded on it – mentally living this apprehending of mental livings and mentally living Ego as expressing itself within the bodily behavior -, am together with this apperceiving life not concerned with the phenomenological epoché.

The **functioning I**[[14]](#footnote-14) and its apperceptive mental livings functioning for the “mentalizing” so to say or the psychic realizing, as all other realizing, are not yet the realized ones, but the realizing ones (constituting something real). The worldly experienced, the “real” or “objective” psychic life is always and in an essentially necessary way a “meant”, “apperceived” one for me, an experienced or in any other way conscious one of a functioning and as that “anonymous” life, of a supposing, experiencing one, etc., partly in the mode of activity, partly in the mode of the hidden background acceptance, situation acceptance respectively conscious in a unitary way and in this way of background consciousness as a universal horizon <of a life,> which is not really apperceived itself in any case. Thus the world is constantly pregiven, and all that is actively given is apperceived with its and due to its horizon. Life, the functioning of which results in pregivenness and every givenness in apperceiving experience, is not pregiven itself and apperceived. It is accessible for the reflective turn of the view [252], which soon combines with a mentalizing apperception within natural-human life.[[15]](#footnote-15)

In common, in pre-phenomenological life that, whatever we have conscious, is always something worldly, something apperceived in the frame of the pregiven being world, and as the case may be mere natural thing or bodies, in which something mental is expressed, or cultural objects, in whose shape and change of shape something mental is expressed in another way, namely as a pointing towards bodily-mental men as purposefully acting, imprinting forms of purpose in things, etc. Indeed, if we purely regard a stone for example as a spatial object, then we have a manifold mental living, which enables us to see and regard it. The functioning apperceptions of experience as the stone’s “subjective” ways of appearance (according to our bodily position towards it, our eye movement, etc.) proceed, but are not thematic, not “objectively apperceived”, not experienced in this sense. We only “look” at the stone and at that, which belongs to it.[[16]](#footnote-16)

The reflection, the turning of the view towards this mental living and its manifoldness soon becomes a subjectivizing one in psychological sense, the mental livings are then named and will be experienced as psychic, being real within psychophysical context. But this new apperception of reflection can always be parenthesized in a phenomenological way, like the always newly to be posited psychological reflections, in which we, reflecting on consciousness – which functioned as a reflection of the first step -, view anew something psychic therein, something belonging to the body already given as being. In the phenomenological attitude by reaching back we find all that, which we have just now [253] pointed out, that is, the consciousness life, which as an **anonymous** one did not carry any psychological apperception, which points every psychological apperception towards such a not yet psychological thing, but that it is ever again to be brought into the game, etc., also by reaching back.

All in all:[[17]](#footnote-17) I can bring into play some experiencing and a consciousness as such in the epoché, by my experiencing myself as an Ego, and as being in some consciousness life, in which for me each and every worldly experienced thing, and universally the world itself becomes conscious, and has its acceptance for me in a “purely” subjective way (and every mode of acceptance), which it simply has for me respectively. This consciousness life is not the psychic one, it is not itself for me a worldly being, but simply that one, in which worldliness as such in all its ways of being gains every sense of acceptance, sense of being for me, which I consequently refrain from using as a judging ground.

As a man I live in the world consciousness, in the having a world, I do not have any individual (single) being but something worldly; world is the universe of the being, always pregiven to me as being, although only as an endless horizon. As a man I am conscious of my own egoical being and life simply as a human one, as unified with my real body, and thus itself as a real Ego. That psychic apperception reiterationally emerging with every reflection belongs to the pregivenness of the world for me; I am, what I am, in this potentiality to always be able to find myself as something psychically living.[[18]](#footnote-18) But as soon as reflection is constructed, in which the total pregivenness of the world comes into view, the universal apperception of the world, which simply is not pregiven, not a proper situation, is subdued to the epoché, and thereby the always realizing experiencing (confirming itself in the univocality of its universal experience <…>[[19]](#footnote-19)

1. But already with relation to myself and in the change of my opinions concerning the world; all relate to the world as world of experience, I always already have such an experience. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. If I say „opinion of all“ though, then this is also my opinion from my experience with „all“ these. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Here some hidden foundings come to pass. I see that the positing of being of something worldly (correlatively the worldly being) is founded itself; the latter one in something subjectively being and in such a way relative to it, that concrete subjectivity as being for itself carries in an intentional way the worldly one in itself. Not within a „merely“ intentional one to which an actual one would have to be contrasted. But actual being is a mode of the intentional being, which within intentional subjectivity is constitutive in its truth, is implied therein in a „merely“ intentional way, it is thought, merely in a cognizing way. The being is in itself, the cognizing does not harm the being, it „only“ cognizes it, [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. „counted“ is deleted by pencil. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. December 12th <19>30. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Experience is in first originality perception, consciousness of something self-present or modified presenting as memory (that which had been perceived) etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Completely different for mere objects. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. 13th December <19>30. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This as the world ground constantly being accepted in a conscious way but uthematic, in which the person is in a psychophysical way, into which it lives by way of governing within the bodiliness, works into it. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Within the transcendental epoché the steps of transcendental evidences, the steps of self-transcendening of the transcendental Ego to be encompassed for itself, are brought to cognition in the evidence of experience and the transcendental acceptance is performed on every step. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *De vera religione*, chapter 39, line 12 f. (ed. J. Martin, Corp. Christ. Ser. Lat. 32, Turnhout 1962, page 234). – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. 14th December <19>30. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. But the apparent equalization of single situations and universal situations is not that simple. The world as universal situation needed to be discovered first, and that my human life, which already finds its way into every situation, belongs to it. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Functioning life. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The part of the sentence ,“which“ till the end of the sentence deleted with a pen. Thereto marginal note: „Not that simple. It is accepted for every situation, since it is itself a unity of pregivenness, self pregiven. The world in complete universality and not as a surrounding world needs to be discovered first, or rather constructed, and it is only then that possible reflection on the functioning life stands up for that as a turn of the view, which is already phenomenological only in need of a „reduction“, of the launching of the purely phenomenological universal theme. If this launching is not performed then the psychologizing of the reflection comes up, which is in need of some exact explanation though.“ – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. All not sufficient. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. All not sufficient. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. All these reflections are themselves contents of pregivenness. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Interrupts. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)